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1. Introduction 
A complex network is a set of items, named vertices or nodes, with connections between them, 
called edges or links. Complex networks describe a wide range of systems in nature and society 
(Albert and Barabasi 2002). Networks (or graphs) can describe real world systems such as the 
Internet, the World Wide Web, social networks (of acquaintance, organizational among individuals, 
work relationship, sexual relationship, and so on), networks of business relations between 
companies, neural networks, metabolic networks, food webs or other ecological networks, 
distribution networks such as roads, airlines, blood vessels or postal delivery routes, networks of 
citations between papers, and others (Newman 2003).  
Since the network structure is useful to shape a very large range of real world systems, it has been 
extensively studied in many field of science in the last twenty years. The study of complex 
networks analyze the properties of these systems, such as the degree distribution, the connectivity, 
the diameter, the clustering coefficient, and so on; these properties and the network structure are 
then compared with the aim to describe  more general patterns and functioning of the real systems 
(Albert and Barabasi 2002; Newman 2003). 
A fundamental issue concerning the functioning of a complex network is the robustness of the 
overall system to the failure of its constituent parts (Albert et al. 2000; Holme 2004). The integrity 
and the functioning of the network can be addressed by analyzing how the network structure 
changes as vertices or links are removed. To understand how the networks functioning changes with 
the removal of the vertices is the same to understand the degree of system robustness. Many works 
have considered how the structure of complex networks change as vertices are removed uniformly 
at random, in decreasing order of their degree, or in decreasing order of their betweenness centrality 
(Albert et al 2000; Albert and Barabasi 2002; Holme 2004). The robustness of the network is an 
interdisciplinary field ranging from social and Internet network, to biological networks as food 
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webs. For these reasons, the robustness of real-world complex networks, such as Internet, electrical 
power grids, airline routes, ecological and biological networks to “node failure” (i.e. node 
malfunctioning or removal) is a topic of fundamental importance for both theoretical and applied 
network science. Node failure can cause the fragmentation of the network, which has consequences 
in terms of system performance, properties, and architecture, such as transportation properties, 
information delivery efficiency and the reachability of network components (i.e. ability to go from 
node of the network to another). In ecology, food webs have been central to ecological research for 
decades and the study of the robustness of food webs to species loss is increasingly relevant for 
species and ecosystem conservation (Dunne et al. 2002; Allesina and Bodini 2004). The loss of a 
species in ecosystems (primary extinction) can cascade into further extinctions (secondary 
extinctions), as consumers’ persistence depends on the persistence of their resources. Many 
theoretical and empirical studies have investigated how food web properties, such as modularity, 
degree-distribution (i.e. the probability distribution of the number of trophic connections of 
species), presence and distribution of keystone species may influence the pattern of secondary 
extinctions in ecosystems as well as food web robustness (Dunne et al. 2002; Jordan et al. 2003; 
Solé and Montoya 2001). In the vast majority of studies on extinction patterns in food webs, a 
species is assumed to go extinct after a primary extinction when is left without any resources to 
exploit (Allesina and Bodini 2004; Allesina and Pascual 2009; Dunne et al. 2002; Solé and 
Montoya 2001).  
This thesis investigates the robustness of real and model networks. In the first chapter “Efficiency of 
attack strategies on complex model and real-world networks” we analyse the robustness of physics 
networks models and real world networks introducing new strategies to remove nodes. In the 
second chapter “Optimization strategies with resource scarcity: from immunization of networks to 
the traveling salesman problem”, we analyse the immunization process in complex networks 
8 
 
introducing the problem of resource scarcity. In the third chapter “Robustness of ecological 
networks” we study the robustness of ecological networks focusing on empirical food webs with a 
new stochastic methods to select species to remove. Each chapter starts with a summary paragraphs 
that describes the research focus and the main results.  
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2. Efficiency of attack strategies on complex model and real-world 
networks 
2.1 Summary 
We investigated the efficiency of attack strategies to network nodes when targeting several complex 
model and real-world networks. We tested 5 attack strategies, 3 of which were introduced in this 
work for the first time, to attack 3 model networks (Erdos and Renyi, Barabasi and Albert 
preferential attachment network, and scale-free network configuration models) and 3 real networks 
(Gnutella peer-to-peer network, email network of the University of Rovira i Virgili, and 
immunoglobulin interaction network). Nodes were removed sequentially according to the 
importance criterion defined by the attack strategy, and we used the size of the largest connected 
component (LCC) as a measure of network damage. We found that the efficiency of attack 
strategies (fraction of nodes to be deleted for a given reduction of LCC size) depends on the 
topology of the network, although attacks based on either the number of connections of a node or 
betweenness centrality were often the most efficient strategies. Sequential deletion of nodes in 
decreasing order of betweenness centrality was the most efficient attack strategy when targeting 
real-world networks.  The relative efficiency of attack strategies often changed during the sequential 
removal of nodes, especially for networks with power-law degree distribution (Bellingeri, Cassi and 
Vincenzi 2014). 
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2.2 Introduction 
2.2.1  The resilience of complex networks 
The resilience of real-world complex networks, such as Internet, electrical power grids, airline 
routes, ecological and biological networks (Callaway et al. 2000; Albert and Barabasi 2002; Holme 
et al. 2002; Bodini et al. 2009; Crucitti et al. 2004; Bellingeri et al. 2013) to “node failure” (i.e. 
node malfunctioning or removal) is a topic of fundamental importance for both theoretical and 
applied network science. Node failure can cause the fragmentation of the network, which has 
consequences in terms of system performance, properties, and architecture, such as transportation 
properties, information delivery efficiency and the reachability of network components (i.e. ability 
to go from node of the network to another) (Holme et al. 2002).  
2.2.2 The attack strategies 
Several studies (Holme et al. 2002; Crucitti et al. 2004; Bakke et al. 2006; Dong et al. 2013) have 
investigated the resilience of model networks using a number of “attack strategies”, i.e. a sequence 
of node removal according to certain properties of the nodes (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Holme et 
al. 2002; Crucitti et al. 2004). A widely-applied attack strategy consists in first ranking the nodes 
with respect to an importance criterion (e.g. number of connections or some measure of centrality) 
and then remove the nodes sequentially from the most to the least important according to the chosen 
criterion until the network either becomes disconnected or loses some essential qualities (Albert et 
al 2000; Holme et al. 2000). However, little is known on how the efficiency of attack strategies (i.e. 
the fraction of nodes to be deleted for a given change in the network) varies when considering 
different real-world and model networks.  
In this context, an underappreciated problem is how the relative efficiency of attack strategies may 
change during the attack to the network. For example, an attack strategy might be more efficient 
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when the targeted (i.e. under attack) network is still pristine, while other strategies may be more 
efficient when the network has already been fragmented and some of its properties have been 
compromised. Testing the efficiency of the different attack strategies when targeting different 
networks may also allow to identify the most important nodes for network functioning, and 
therefore which nodes should be primarily protected, as in the case of computer  (Cohen et al. 2001) 
or ecological networks (Bellingeri et al. 2013; Solé and Montoya  2001; Curtsdotter et al. 2011; 
Ebenman 2011) or removed, as in the case of immunization/disease networks (Pastor-Satorras and 
Vespignani 2002).  
2.2.3 Introducing new attack strategies on complex networks 
In this work, we test the efficiency of both well-known attack strategies and new strategies 
introduced for the first time in this paper when targeting either model or real-world networks. We 
used the size of the largest connected component (LCC) (i.e. the largest number of nodes connected 
among them in the network, (Albert and Barabasi 2002)) as a measure of network damage. We 
found for model networks that the best strategy to reduce the size of the LCC depended on the 
topology of the network that was attacked. For real-world networks, the removal of nodes using 
betweenness centrality as importance criterion was consistently the most efficient attack strategy. 
For some networks, we found that an attack strategy can be more efficient than others up to a 
certain fraction of nodes removed, but other attack strategies can become more efficient after that 
fraction of nodes has been removed.  
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2.3.Methods 
2.3.1 Attack strategies 
We attacked the networks by sequentially removing nodes following some importance criteria. We 
compared the efficiency of a pool of attacks strategies, some of which have been already described 
in the literature while others are introduced in this work for the first time.  
Most of the analyses on the robustness of network have investigated the effect of removing nodes 
according to their rank (i.e. number of links of the node) or some measures of centrality (Holme et 
al. 2000; Albert et al. 2000; Gallos et al. 2006). In this work, we introduce new attack strategies that 
focus entirely or in part on less local properties of a node, in particular its number of second 
neighbors, as explained in detail below.  
2.3.2 The Largest Connected Component (LCC) 
Several indexes and measures have been proposed in order to describe network damage. We use the 
size of the largest connected component (LCC), i.e. the size of the largest connected sub-graph in 
the network (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Holme et al. 2002), as a measure of network damage during 
the attack, where a faster decrease in the size of the LCC indicates a more efficient attack strategy. 
In order to compare attack strategies across networks, we normalized LCC size at any point during 
the attack with respect to the starting LCC size, i.e. the number of nodes in the LCC before the 
attack. 
2.3.3 The recalculated attack strategies 
For each attack strategy, we applied both the recalculated and non-recalculated method. With the 
recalculated method, the property of the node relevant for the attack strategy (e.g. number of links) 
was recalculated after each node removal. On the other hand, when applying the non-recalculated 
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method the property of the node was measured before the first node removal and was not updated 
during the sequential deletion of nodes. With q we indicate the fraction of nodes removed during 
the sequential removal of nodes. An attack strategy is less efficient than another when a higher q to 
reduce the LCC to zero (or any other size).  
In this work, we used 2 attack strategies that have already been described in the literature. First-
degree neighbors (First): nodes are sequentially removed according to the number of first neighbors 
of each node (i.e. node rank). In the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), the sequence of 
removal of nodes is randomly chosen. Nodes betweenness centrality (Bet): nodes are sequentially 
removed according to their betweenness centrality, which is the number of shortest paths from all 
vertices to all others that pass through that node (Holme et al. 2002; Barthelemy 2004).  
2.3.4 The introduced attack strategies 
We introduced in the present work the following new attack strategies. Second-degree neighbors 
(Sec): nodes are sequentially removed according to the number of second neighbors of each node. 
Second neighbors of node j are nodes that have a node in common with - but are not directly 
connected to - node j. First + Second neighbors (F+S): nodes are deleted according to the sum of 
first and second neighbors of each node. Combined first and second degree (Comb): nodes are 
removed according to their rank. In the case of ties, nodes are removed according to their second 
degree.  
For all attack nodes were sequentially removed from most to least connected. In the case of Bet, 
nodes were sequentially removed from higher to lower betweenness centrality. For each network, 
we tested the relative efficiency of the five attack strategies in reducing the LCC to zero. In 
addition, we tested whether the relative efficiency of attack strategies changed along the removal 
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sequence, i.e. whether an attack strategies was less efficient than another at the beginning of the 
attack, but more efficient after a fraction q of nodes was removed.   
2.3.5 Networks 
We tested the new attack strategies on 3 types of model networks and 3 real world networks.  
The 6 networks are undirected and unweighted graphs in which nodes are connected by links or 
edges, and rank k of a node is the number of links of that node. Each link may represent several real 
world interactions. For instance, in social networks links between nodes represent interactions 
between individuals or groups, such as co-authorship in scientific publications or friendship (Albert 
and Barabasi 2002). In cellular networks, nodes are chemicals species connected by chemical 
reactions (Ma and Zeng 2003), while in ecological networks links describe the trophic interactions 
between species or group of species, e.g. the energy and matter passing from prey to predator 
(Bellingeri et al. 2013; Ebenman 2011; Dunne et al. 2002). 
2.3.6 Model networks 
We tested the attack strategies on (i) Erdos and Renyi graphs (Erdos and Renyi 1969), (ii) Barabasi 
and Albert preferential attachment networks (Albert and Barabasi 2002), and (iii) scale-free 
network configuration models (Dorogotsev et al. 2008). For each model network, we tested the 
efficiency of attack strategies on networks of different size, as explained below. Since each model 
network is a random realization of the network-generating mechanism, we tested the attack 
strategies on 50 random realizations of each model network used the mean across replicates of the 
normalized LCC size at each fraction q of nodes removed as a measure of network damage. We 
observed a small variation of LCC size at each fraction q of nodes removed across different 
realizations of networks, thus the mean LCC size across replicates well represented the overall 
behavior of the attack strategy. 
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The Erdos and Renyi (ER) model generates a random graph with N nodes connected by L links, 
which are chosen randomly with an occupation probability p from Lmax = N(N
-
1)/2 possible links, 
i.e. p is the proportion of realized links from Lmax. The expected number of links is <L> = (N
2
p)/2 
and the expected rank of a node is <k> = Np. The random graph can be defined by the number of 
nodes N and the occupation probability p, i.e. ER(N,p) [21]. We analyzed ER graphs with different 
values of N and p, specifically: ER(N = 500, p = 0.008),  ER(1000, 0.004), ER(10000, 0.0004).  
The Barabasi and Albert preferential attachment network (BA) is created starting from few isolated 
nodes and by then growing the network by adding new nodes and links (Albert and Barabasi 2002). 
At each step in the creation of the network, one node and m outgoing links from the new node are 
added to the network. The probability  that the new node will be connected to node i already in the 
network is function of the degree ki of node i, such that 
1
( ) /
j
i i j
j N
k k k


   (i.e. preferential 
attachment, since more connected nodes are more likely to be connected to the new node). The BA 
network is defined by parameters N and m. We built BA scale free networks with parameters 
BA(N=500, m = 2),  BA(1000, 2), BA(10000, 2).  
We created networks with power-law degree distribution using the configuration model for 
generalized random graphs (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Dorogotsev et al. 2008). This model is 
defined as follows.  A discrete degree distribution P(K = k) = k
-α
 is defined, such that P(k) is the 
proportion of nodes in the network having degree k. The maximum node degree kmax is equal to N, 
where N is the number of nodes. The domain of the discrete function P(k) becomes (1, kmax). We 
generated the degree sequence of the nodes by randomly drawing N values k1,…,kn from the degree 
distribution. Then, for each node i we assigned a link with node j with probability P(ki)P(kj.) A 
scale free configuration model network is defined by parameters N, α and <k>. We analyzed scale 
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free network with parameters CM(N = 500, α = 2.5, <k> = 3.8), CM(1 000,2.5,3.8), CM(10 
000,2.5,3.9).  
2.3.7 Real world networks 
We tested the attack strategies on the following real-world networks: (i) The Gnutella P2P (peer-to-
peer) network (Gnutella) (Ripeanu et al. 2004), (ii) the email network of the University Rovira i 
Virgili (URV) in Tarragona, Spain (Email) (Guimerà et al. 2003), and (iii) the immunoglobulin 
interaction network (Immuno) (Gfeller 2006). Nodes of Gnutella (N=8846, L=31839) represent 
hosts in the peer-to-peer network, while links represent connections between the hosts. E-mail 
(N=1134, L=10902) provides an example of the flow of information within a human organization. 
Immuno is the undirected and connected graph of interactions in the immunoglobulin protein (N = 
1316, L = 6300) where nodes represent amino acids, and two amino acids are linked if they interact 
in the immunoglobulin protein. 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1 Non-Recalculated method 
2.4.1.1 Model networks  
ER: For all sizes of networks, the 5 attack strategies were equally efficient in reducing the size of 
the LCC up to q ~= 0.2. For q >0.2, First was the most efficient strategy to reduce the size of the 
LCC to 0.  
CM: For N = 500, Comb was the most efficient strategy early in the removal sequence., while First 
became the most efficient strategy for q > 0.1. For N = 1 000, Comb, Bet, and First had the same 
efficiency. For N = 10000, Comb, Bet, and First were equally efficient up to q = 0.1, while for q > 
0.1 First was the most efficient strategy.  
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BA:  For N = 500, First, Comb and Bet were equally efficient in reducing the size of the LCC. For 
bigger networks, First, Comb and Bet were equally efficient up to q = 0.8 (N = 1 000) and q = 0.5 
(N = 10 000). Then, Bet became more efficient than First and Comb. 
For graphical representation of these results see Fig. 1. 
2.4.1.2 Real-world networks  
Email: Bet was the most efficient strategy to reduce LCC up to q~= 0.3. For greater fractions of 
nodes removed, First and Comb were slightly more efficient than Bet. 
Immuno: Bet was distinctly more efficient than other strategies up to q = 0.55. For q > 0.55, all 
strategies were equally efficient. 
Gnutella: Bet was the most efficient attack strategy.  
For graphical representation of these results see Fig. 2. 
2.4.2 Recalculated method 
2.4.2.1 Model networks  
ER: First and Comb were the most efficient strategies to reduce the LCC up to q~=0.2. For q > 0.2, 
Bet became more efficient than First. Sec was the least efficient strategy. 
CM: Comb was the most efficient strategy up to q~=0.1. For q > 0.1, Bet was the most efficient 
strategy, while Sec was the least efficient strategies. 
BA: Comb was the most efficient strategy up to q~=0.1. First, F+S and Bet attack induced a 
slightly slower decrease in LCC size. For q > 0.1, Bet became the most efficient strategy. Sec was 
the least efficient strategy. See Fig. 3. 
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2.4.2.2 Real-world networks  
Email: All attack strategies were equally efficient up to q = 0.12. For q > 0.12, Bet was the most 
efficient attack strategy.  
Immuno: Bet was largely the most efficient attack strategy. 
Gnutella: All attack strategies were equally efficient up to q = 0.1. For q > 0.1, Bet was the most 
efficient attack strategy.  
For graphical representation of these results see Fig. 4. 
2.5 Discussion 
We discuss the following main results of our work: (i) attacks were largely more efficient with the 
recalculated than with the non-recalculated method; (ii) the efficiency of attack strategies on model 
networks depended on network topology; (iii) the sequential removal of nodes according to their 
betweenness centrality was the most efficient attack to real-world networks; (iv) for some networks, 
the relative efficiency of attack strategies changed during the removal sequence. 
2.5.1 The recalculated methods are more efficient 
We found that the recalculated method provided more efficient attacks than the non-recalculated 
method, i.e. for a given fraction of nodes removed from the network, a larger reduction of LCC was 
obtained with the recalculated method.  This result confirms the findings of other analyses on 
robustness of networks (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Holme et al. 2002), which found that updated 
information on the topology of the system after each removal allowed for more efficient attacks to 
networks.  
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However, non-recalculated attack strategies are implemented in various relevant settings and are 
equivalent in practice to the simultaneous removal of nodes, as it happens in the case of vaccination 
campaigns  (i.e. the strategy is vaccinating at the same time nodes of the contact network with the 
highest probability of acquiring or transmitting the disease) or attacks to computer networks (Cohen 
et al. 2001).  
2.5.2 The attack efficiency depends on networks topology 
For model networks, the efficiency of the attack strategies depended on network topology. In the 
case of networks with power-law degree distribution, the efficiency of the attack strategies 
depended also on network size. Across all model networks and considering both the non-
recalculated and recalculated methods, attack strategies based on either node betweenness centrality 
or node rank were the most efficient ones. However, the sequential deletion of nodes according to 
their betweenness centrality was consistently the most efficient attack strategy to real-world 
networks, with the only exception of the attack to the Email network with the non-recalculated 
method. While in some cases Bet was only slightly more efficient than other strategies in reducing 
the size of the largest connected component, in others Bet was largely the most efficient strategy. 
For example, in the immunoglobulin interaction network, deleting a very small fraction of nodes 
with high betweenness centrality reduced the size of the normalized LCC of more than 60% using 
either the recalculated and non-recalculated method, while - for the same fractions of nodes 
removed - other attack strategies caused only a 1-5% reduction in LCC size. Betweenness centrality 
describes how “central” a node is in the network by considering the fraction of shortest paths that 
pass through that node (Barthelemy 2004). Nodes with betweenness centrality greater than 0 play a 
major role in connecting areas of the network that would otherwise be either sparsely connected or 
disconnected (Newman 2003). Thus, betweenness centrality an important centrality measure for a 
social, technological, computer, and biological networks. The higher efficiency of the strategy based 
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on node betweenness centrality with respect to the attack based on node rank in real-world networks 
can be explained by the fact that in real-world networks some of the critical nodes (i.e. nodes whose 
persistence strongly contribute to maintaining network integrity) are either not highly linked, or that 
the highly-linked nodes are not located in the network core (Newman 2003). 
2.5.3 The new introduced Combined strategy is more efficient in some cases 
When applying the recalculated method, the newly-introduced Combined attack strategy was the 
most efficient strategy to decrease LCC size in the scale free network configuration model and in 
the Barabasi-Albert model up to q = 0.1. The Combined attack first select nodes according to their 
rank, then, in the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), it sequentially removes nodes 
according to their second degree. On the contrary, in the case of ties First randomly chooses the 
removal sequence for the nodes with the same rank. Thus, at the beginning of the attack to the 
network, when two or more major hubs have the same number of links to other nodes, removing 
first the hub with the greatest second degree causes a faster decrease in LCC size than to randomly 
select the removal sequence for those hubs.  
Later in the attack sequence, the Combined strategy was less efficient than the First strategy to 
attack scale free networks; this might be due to the fact that after a certain fraction of hubs has been 
deleted, removing first (in the case of ties) the node(s) with the highest second degree(s) would 
remove more peripheral and less important nodes, i.e. nodes that are less likely to be part of the 
largest connected component.  
2.5.4 The efficiency changed along the removal sequences 
Further, the efficiency of attack strategies changed along the sequential removal of nodes. This was 
particularly clear for networks with power-law degree distribution. It follows that the percolation 
threshold, i.e. the fraction of nodes removed for which the size of the largest connected component 
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reaches zero, might be for some networks little correlated with the fraction of nodes to be removed 
in order to reduce the largest connected component to a size greater than 0. This result has 
important implications for applied network science and deserves further investigations. For 
example, in the case of immunization strategies, choosing the attack strategy according to the 
percolation threshold may be of little use when the goal is to reduce as much as possible the size of 
LCC with just a few targeted immunizations. Lastly, the use LCC as a measure of the efficiency of 
the network may not be appropriate for immune networks. Immune networks, such as neural or 
lymphocyte networks, reveal a specific and non-trivial architecture and they can display peculiar 
features when diluted. For this reason, differently from what happens in other kind of systems, 
when in immune networks the LCC decreases, the performance of the network can actually improve 
(Agliari et al. 2012; Agliari et al. 2013)  
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Figure 1. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for non-recalculated targeted attacks to model 
networks. Points are plotted every 20 nodes removed for networks with N = 500 and N =1000, and every 200 nodes 
removed for N =10000. 
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Figure 2. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for non-recalculated targeted attacks to real-
world networks. Points are plotted every 50 nodes removed for Email and Immuno networks, and every 200 nodes 
removed for Gnutella. 
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Figure 3. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for recalculated targeted attacks to model 
networks. Points are plotted every 20 nodes removed for networks with N = 500 and N =1 000, and every 200 nodes 
removed for N =10000. 
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Figure 4. Size of normalized LCC and the fraction q of nodes removed for recalculated targeted attacks to real-world 
networks. Points are plotted every 50 nodes removed for Email and Immuno networks, and every 200 nodes removed 
for Gnutella. 
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3. Optimization strategies with resource scarcity: from immunization of 
networks to the traveling salesman problem 
3.1 Summary 
The development of efficient immunization strategies is a fundamental issue in the cross-field 
research between the physical network theory and the biological science. In these cases one 
typically applies targeted immunization strategies where individuals playing a special role in the 
network community are immunized first. Recently, many different immunization strategies have 
been developed. The efficiency of a strategy is usually evaluated in terms of percolation threshold, 
i.e. the number of vaccine doses producing the vanishes of the Largest Connected Cluster (LCC). 
The immunization strategies inducing the fastest vanishes in the LCC (e.g. the minimum percolation 
threshold) represents the optimal way to immunize the network.  In this work we simulate several 
immunization processes on different kinds of  model and real world networks. Here we show that 
the efficacy of the removal strategies can change during the immunization process. This means that 
in the first fraction of  immunized individuals the strategy A can perform better than the strategy B. 
In correspondence of a certain fraction of vaccination q*  we assist to the efficacy transition and the 
strategy B becomes more efficient than A. We call the q*  the ‘transition threshold’.  This means 
that, if the number of doses is limited, the best strategy is not necessarily the one leading to the 
smallest percolation threshold. This outcome should warn about the adoption of global measures in 
order to evaluate the best immunization strategy. In addition, we evidence analogous phenomena 
for the traveling salesman problem (TSP). This new perspective has important implications for 
health policies, such as the tumor angiogenesis research, for immunology processes of short 
generation time virus (e.g., HIV), or in general, to evaluate the best solution of optimization 
problems in the presence of some constraints (Bellingeri, Agliari and Cassi 2015, under review). 
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3.2 Introduction 
3.2.1 Immunization strategies in complex networks 
Complex networks describe a wide range of systems in nature and society, such as Internet, 
electrical power grids, ecological, biological and social networks (Callaway et al. 2000; Albert and 
Barabasi 2002; Bellingeri et al. 2013; Agliari et al. 2011; Agliari et al. 2012). In this field, the 
immunization of large populations or apparati through vaccination or intrusion detection protocols 
is an extremely important issue with obvious implications for the public health and security 
(Schneider et al. 2011; Anderson and May 1992; Gallos et al. 2005; Hadidjojo and Cheong 2011). 
With this goal, many immunization strategies have been developed in the last years (Hadidjojo and 
Cheong 2011; Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani 2002; Serrano et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2008; 
Schneider et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 2013). Considering the topology of the network, the question how 
to immunize a given network with a minimum number of operations (e.g., vaccine doses) is 
mathematically equivalent to understand how to fragment the Largest Connected Cluster (LCC) 
with a minimum number of node removals (Hadidjojo and Cheong 2011; Chen et al. 2008), (see 
Figure 5 for an example of the immunization method).  
In recent papers, the efficacy of the removal strategy is usually evaluated in terms of the percolation 
threshold qc, i.e. the fraction of nodes removed for which the LCC reaches the value of zero (Chen 
et al. 2008; Hasegawa and Naoki 2011; Huang et al. 2011; Samuelsson and Socolar 2006; Zeng and 
Liu 2012). In all these cases one supposes to rely on potentially unlimited resources (e.g., unlimited 
vaccine doses, fuel, time, budget).  
3.2.2 Immunization strategies with limited resources 
Here, we start from an assigned amount of resources and we evaluate the best strategy as a function 
of this constraint. Using different strategies for selecting nodes, we present simulated immunization 
processes on different real world networks, i.e. the immunoglobulin interaction network (Gfeller 
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2007) and the Email network of the University Rovira i Virgili (Guimerà et al. 2003), and model 
networks, that is the “Hebbian networks” (Agliari and Barra 2012) and the Erdös-Rényi random 
graphs (Erdös and Rényi 1960). See the Methods section for a detailed explanation of the used 
immunization strategies. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Immunization strategies 
We simulated the network immunization by sequentially vaccinating (removing) nodes 
(individuals) following some importance criteria. We compared a pool of immunization strategies. 
Most of the analyses on immunization processes on networks have investigated the effect of 
vaccinating nodes according to their rank (i.e. number of first or second neighbors) or some 
measures of centrality (Dorogotsev et al. 2008; Albert and Barabasi 2002). For each immunization 
strategy, we applied both the recalculated and non recalculated methods. In the recalculated method, 
the property of the node relevant for the immunization strategy (e.g. number of neighbors or 
centrality) was recalculated after each node immunization. In the non recalculated method, the 
property of the node was computed before the first node removal and was not updated during the 
process. 
Several indexes and measures have been introduced to describe network immunization. In this 
research, we use the size of the largest connected component (LCC), i.e. the size of the largest 
connected sub-graph in the network (Chen et al. 2008; Zeng and Lyu 2012), as a measure of nodes 
vaccinated during the immunization process. A faster decrease in the size of the LCC indicates a 
more efficient immunization strategy.  
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Figure 5: The immunization procedure. Starting from the original network (on the left) two nodes (in white color) are 
selected and consequently removed. The resulting network (on the right) turns out to be disconnected into four 
components. At this stage, the largest component can be further processed and one node (in white color) can be 
removed in such a way that this component will be fragmented in four small components. In this example targeted 
nodes are detected according to the betweenness strategy. 
In literature, an immunization strategy is less efficient than another when a higher the fraction of 
nodes has to be vaccinated to reduce the LCC to quasi zero. With q we indicate the fraction of nodes 
removed during the sequential immunization of nodes. In our research we consider the efficacy of 
immunization strategy during the whole process. After the simulation, we contrasted the different 
strategies as a function of the immunized nodes q. First-degree neighbors: nodes are sequentially 
immunized according to the number of first neighbors of each node. Second-degree neighbors: 
nodes are sequentially immunized according to the number of second neighbors of each node. 
Second neighbors of a node are nodes that have a node in common with, but are not directly 
connected to, the node. First + Second neighbors: nodes are vaccinated according to the sum of 
first and second neighbors of each node. In the case of ties (i.e. nodes with the same rank), the 
sequence of nodes vaccinations was randomly chosen. Nodes betweenness centrality: nodes are 
sequentially vaccinated according to their betweenness centrality. The betweenness centrality of a 
node represents the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that 
node. For all strategies nodes were sequentially immunized from most to least ranked.   
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3.3.2 Networks 
The networks we used are undirected and unweighted graphs in which nodes are connected by links 
or edges, and rank k of a node is the number of links of that node. Each link may represent several 
real world interactions. In social networks links between nodes represent interactions between 
individuals or groups, such as co authorship in scientific publications or friendship (Callaway et al. 
2000; Albert and Barabasi 2002). In cellular networks, nodes are chemicals species connected by 
chemical reactions (Zeng and Lyu 2012), while in ecological networks links describe the trophic 
interactions between species or group of species, e.g. the energy and matter passing from prey to 
predator (Bellingeri et al. 2013). Moreover, in immunological networks, nodes represent 
lymphocytes or antibodies and a link connecting a couple of nodes mirrors a large enough affinity 
between the related receptors (Agliari et al. 2012). 
3.3.3 Model networks 
We tested the attack strategies on Erdös-Rényi random graphs and on the Hebbian network.   
The Erdös-Rényi (ER) model generates a random graph with N nodes connected by L links, which 
are chosen randomly with an occupation probability p from Lmax = N(N-1)/2 possible links, i.e. p is 
the proportion of realized links from Lmax. The expected number of links is <L> = (N
2
p)/2 and the 
expected rank of a node is <k> = Np. The random graph can be defined by the number of nodes N 
and the probability p, i.e. ER(N,p) (Erdös and Rényi 1960).  
The Hebbian network model generates a random graph with N nodes, each associated to a set of P 
binary attributes, namely {ξi1, ξi2,..., ξiP} for the i-th node, in such a way that the link connecting 
two nodes, say i and j, has a weight given by the Hebbian kernel Jij =
1
P
 ξi
μ
 ξjμ . The NxP 
entries {ξiμ}i,μ are identically and independently extracted from a uniform distribution P(ξi
μ
=0)=1- 
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P(ξiμ=1)=(1-a)/2, where a ∈ [-1,1]. Thus, by tuning a, different topological regimes can be 
recovered (Agliari and Barra 2011). Moreover, the emerging topology displays a number of 
peculiar features such as the small-world property and it recovers the Granovetter theory. 
3.3.4 Real world networks 
We tested the attack strategies on the email network of the University Rovira i Virgili (URV) in 
Tarragona, Spain (E-mail) (Guimerà et al. 2003), and the immunoglobulin interaction network 
(Immuno) (Gfeller 2007). As explained in the previous chapter, the E-mail (N=1134, L=10902) 
provides a representative example of the flow of information within a human organization and the 
Immuno is the undirected and connected graph of interactions in the immunoglobulin protein (N = 
1316, L = 6300) where nodes represent amino acids and two amino acids are linked if they interact 
in the immunoglobulin protein. 
3.3.5 The travelling salesman model (TSP) 
We considered the travelling salesman problem (TSP), which consists in finding, for a given list of 
cities and distances between each pair of cities, the shortest possible route that visits each city 
exactly once and returns to the origin city. Otherwise state, defining a complete graph G=(V,E) 
whose nodes (making up the set V) represents cities and whose links (making up the set of ordered 
pairs E) display a weight measuring the distance between the cities connected pairwise, the TSP 
asks for the cycle of minimum cost visiting all of the vertices of G exactly once. This problem is 
known to be NP-hard as, being n the number of cities, if we try to determine the solution of this 
problem systematically, we would end up with (n-1)! possible solutions. Clearly, we cannot 
examine all possible solutions for minimum cost and several algorithms for a numerical solution of 
the problem have been built up. In general, one could follow empirical or practical algorithms 
according to the particular problem considered. For instance, one could follow a ``myopic route'' 
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flying, step by step, to the closest city. This can be formalized as follows: starting from i we move 
to j such that min{k  V}d(i,k)=j; in the following step we move to z such that min{ k V \ 
j}d(i,k)=z and so on. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 The crossover threshold  
We find that the rank of efficacy of the removal strategies can change depending on the amount of 
available resources. For example, in the first steps of an immunization process a strategy A can 
perform better than a strategy B. In correspondence of a certain fraction of removals q* we assist to 
the efficacy transition and the strategy B becomes more efficient than A. We call the q*  the 
‘crossover threshold’ (see Fig. 6).  In this case, the percolation threshold (i.e. the fraction of nodes 
to be removed for the size of the largest connected component to vanish), commonly used as a 
measure of the strategy efficacy (Chen et al. 2008; Schneider et al. 2012; Iyer et al. 2013; Hasegawa 
and Naoki 2011; Huang et al. 2011; Samuelsson and Socolar 2006; Zeng and Lyu 2012), may be 
misleading, since the goal is to reduce as much as possible the size of LCC with just the few “shots” 
available. What matters here is being able to fast reduce the size of the LCC in the early stage of the 
immunization process and this, for many networks, may be little correlated with the fraction of 
nodes to be removed to underpercolate the network. In fact, the latter considers only the ending 
point of the immunization process, i.e. the total number of individuals that we have to immunize in 
order to completely destroy the LCC and consequently to reduce to zero the probability of new 
infection events.  
33 
 
 
Figure 6: The crossover threshold in the immunization process outcomes. The LCC versus the fraction of 
immunized nodes q for different strategies and for different networks. The first main panel on the top shows the whole 
immunization process for the Email real world network; in the little panels (a-e) are highlighted the crossover threshold 
for different real world networks. (a) black line is the system response using non-recalculated betweenness strategy 
where nodes are removed according to their betweenness centrality, which is the number of shortest paths from all 
vertices to all others that pass through that node, and red line the removal based on the non-recalculated first degree 
where nodes are sequentially removed according to the number of first neighbors for the Email real world network; (b) 
black line indicates the recalculated first degree strategy and the red line the recalculated degree strategy for the 
Immuno real world network; (c) the black line is the recalculated first degree strategy and the red line represents the 
recalculated first+second degree strategy for the Hebbian model with parameters N=500, L=300, a=-0.983; (d) we focus 
on the cross between the black lines representing the random removal strategy and the red line represents the 
recalculated first+second degree strategy response for the Hebbian model with parameters N=500, L=500, a=-0.99: 
crossover threshold between recalculated first degree strategy (black line) and recalculated betweenness strategy (red 
line) for a Erdös-Rényi random graphs (e) N=500, p=0.008 and (f) N=500, p=0.007. 
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3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 The efficacy of the strategies depends on the number of vaccine doses 
Having enough available doses to immunize the entire population is, of course, the best scenario, 
yet hardly applicable in real world conditions. In real world scenarios, the shortage of the resources 
affects all the decision policies. For example, when a political subject has to decide which strategy 
to adopt in order to immunize in the best efficient way a population, it has also to consider the 
limited number of vaccine units available (due to e.g., constraints in budget, qualified staff, number 
of doses (Dupuy and Freidel 1990;  Schwalbe et al. 2010)). Further, the vaccination procedures take 
time, either for planning the operations, or to carry out the practical immunization of the individuals 
or the production mechanisms of the immunization agents may be inadequate or slow to supply the 
actual request. For this reason, the distributed immunization doses may cover only a small fraction 
of the entire population.  
3.5.2 Resource shortage and policies in different type of model networks 
The pattern shown here can be extended to many different contexts and with different purposes. In 
fact, if the immunization process is looked at as an attack process, where selected nodes are 
impaired, then effective immunization processes also turn out to be effective attack processes able 
to disconnect a network with a limited number of interventions. Thus, being aware of the existence 
of effective attack strategies for a given topology may allow a proper protection of the network by, 
e.g., reinforcing the most susceptible nodes. Moreover, in the case of denial-of-service (DoS) attack 
to a network, one could have to face the limited size of the botnet (Yu 2014). On the other hand, 
there may exist situations where the destruction or at least a rearrangement of the network is sought 
for.  
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For instance, in tumor angiogenesis research, a proper network attack is nowadays strongly 
investigated as a practice to inhibit tumor growth (Welter and Rieger 2013; Jain et al. 2007). Here 
the constraints could arise due to the individual resilience to the therapy toxicity. 
Immunology offers other examples of systems where the amount and the effectiveness of resources 
play a fundamental role. In this case the threat is played by a virus load and the organization to be 
preserved is given by the lymphocyte network: Once a virus has invaded a lymphocyte cell, it starts 
to manipulate the host cell in such a way that the viral genome is multiplied and new virus particles 
are assembled and then released from the host cell. From this perspective it is the network of 
lymphocyte cells to be attacked: infected cells produce new virus, and new free virus infects healthy 
cells to produce new infected cells. Depending on the average life-time of virions and of infected 
cells, and according to the time scale of virus mutation, the outcome can be dramatically different 
(Nowak and May 2000).  
In the case of virus mutating in fast time-scales, that is displaying a short generation time (this is the 
case of e.g., HIV), being aware of the number of cells that can be effectively targeted for further 
lysis in a given amount of time has strong relevance for the kind of strategy to implement (Nowak 
and May 2000).  
 
3.5.3 The critical threshold pattern in other fields: the traveling salesman problem 
In the end we discuss the crucial role of scarcity of resources in optimization problems in different 
fields. We consider the traveling salesman problem (TSP), which consists in finding, for a given list 
of cities and distances between each pair of cities, the shortest possible route that visits each city 
exactly once and returns to the origin city.  
Otherwise stated, defining a complete graph G whose nodes represents cities and whose links  
display a weight measuring the distance between the cities connected pairwise, the TSP asks for the 
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cycle of minimum cost visiting all of the vertices of G exactly once. This problem is known to be 
NP-hard and it finds applications in many research areas such as operations research, theoretical 
computer science, and logistic (Applegate et al. 2006). 
We simulated the salesman who visits the European capitals (Fig. 7):  the best route obtained is 
compared with a “myopic route” which, at each step selects the closest city; for both strategies we 
account the number of visited cities as a function of the overall distance covered (i.e. time or 
consumed fuel), (see Fig. 7).  
Interestingly, although the latter route takes more time to accomplish the complete task, its early 
rate is significantly larger. Indeed, we can still outline a crossover threshold q* which roughly 
corresponds to 75% of the overall investment. Moreover, at half of the investment the myopic 
strategy has visited almost twice cities. It should also be noted that this strategy also requires a 
negligible computing time for its evaluation with respect to the optimized way.  
This means that the efficacy of a strategy (number of visited towns) depends on the available 
resources (fuel). This has important consequences especially when some constraints on fuel, time 
or, more generally, “coverage” are included. In fact, an overall good strategy may result to perform 
rather poorly at short coverage. 
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Figure 7: The travelling salesman problem. The set V of European cities and the set E of their pairwise distances are 
considered. We found a solution for the TSP on G(V,E) according to different strategies (left panel): myopic (blue), and 
best (black).  The starting point is fixed on Rome and the path corresponding to myopic strategy is depicted (right 
panel). Notice that if, due to constraints, the overall distance covered should be limited to, say, 20 or to 70, respectively, 
the strategy ranking would be different. 
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4. Robustness of ecological networks 
4.1 Summary 
  
The robustness of ecological networks, i.e. the food webs, is a fundamental topic in ecology. The 
robustness of food web is generally analysed removing species in the systems and counting how 
many species go secondarily extinct. The removal can be at random or selecting most connected 
species (attack). Random removal and the attack from most- to least-connected node (i.e. species) 
are the two limit criteria for sequential extinction of species in food webs, but a continuum of 
possibilities exists between them.  
We use simulations to test the robustness of 14 empirical food webs to species loss by varying a 
parameter I (intentionality) that defines the removal probability (extinction risk) of species with 
high number of trophic connections. The removal probability of  highly-connected species increases 
with I. We found that food web robustness decreases slowly when the extinction risk of highly-
connected species increases (we call this region random removal regime), until a threshold value of 
I is reached. For greater values of the threshold, we found a dramatic reduction in robustness with 
increasing intentionality in almost all the food webs (intentional attack regime).  
Link-dense networks were more robust to an increase of I. Larger food webs (i.e. higher species 
richness) were more sensitive (i.e. robustness decreased faster) to the increase of extinction risk of 
highly-connected species. The existence of a clear transition in system behaviour has relevant 
consequences for the interpretation of extinction patterns in ecosystems and prioritizing species for 
conservation planning (Bellingeri, Cassi and Vincenzi 2013).  
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4.2 Introduction 
4.2.1 Ecological networks: the food webs 
Food webs are ecological networks that describe the feeding (trophic) relationship among 
diverse species in communities or ecosystems (Camerano 1880; Cohen et al. 1990; Dunne 2006; 
Bellingeri and Bodini 2013). In other terms, a food web is the natural interconnection of food chain 
and generally a graphical representation of what-eats-whom in an ecological community (Allesina 
and Bodini 2004). In the graph-network representation of the food web nodes indicates species and 
a link (or edges) connecting two nodes is the trophic relationship between the two species. The food 
webs are directed networks and the direction of the link indicates the transferring of energy and 
matter from the prey (or resource) and the predator (or consumer). See Figure 8 for a very simple 
example of a food web and Figure 9 for a detailed graphical depiction of the intertidal food web of 
Sanak Island, Alaska with 171 species. 
 
Figure 8: simple example of a terrestrial food web (http://eatingrecipe.com/). 
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Figure 9: Depiction of the intertidal food web of Sanak Island, Alaska, spheres represent species or groups of species, 
and the links between them show feeding relationships. The Sanak Island food web has 171 species 
(http://www.newswise.com/articles/research-examines-ancient-humans-as-major-predators-in-marine-food-webs-
suggesting-lessons-for-sustainability). 
 
4.2.2 The robustness of food webs 
Food webs have been central to ecological research for decades (Cattin et al. 2004; Jordan et al. 
2003; May 1972; Mc Cann 2000; Montoya and Solé 2003), and the study of the robustness of food 
webs to species loss is increasingly relevant for species and ecosystem conservation (Montoya et al. 
2006; Raffaelli 2004; Zavaleta 2004).  
The loss of a species in ecosystems (primary extinction) can cascade into further extinctions 
(secondary extinctions), as consumers’ persistence depends on the persistence of their resources. 
Many theoretical and empirical studies have investigated how food web properties, such as 
modularity, degree-distribution (i.e. the probability distribution of the number of trophic 
connections of species), presence and distribution of keystone species may influence the pattern of 
secondary extinctions in ecosystems as well as food web robustness (Allesina and Pascual 2009; 
Bascompte et al. 2005; Dunne et al. 2002; Jordan et al. 2003; Solé and Montoya 2001). In the vast 
majority of studies on extinction patterns in food webs, a species is assumed to go extinct after a 
primary extinction when is left without any resources to exploit (Allesina and Bodini 2004; Allesina 
and Pascual 2009; Dunne et al. 2002; Solé and Montoya 2001). This is clearly the best-case 
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scenario (Allesina and Pascual 2009; Dunne 2006), as the occurrence of other common effects, such 
as size-dependent-dynamics, top-down cascades or energetic thresholds, would result in additional 
losses (Bellingeri and Bodini 2013; Curtsdotter et al. 2011; Dunne 2006).  
 
4.2.3 Simulations studies of cascading extinctions: attack and error removal 
Simulation studies have shown that the extinction of highly-connected species is likely to generate a 
greater number of secondary extinctions than when species are randomly removed from the food 
web (Allesina and Bodini 2004; Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne and Williams 2009; Solé and Montoya 
2001). Notions of error and attack sensitivity were first introduced in the physical literature and then 
successfully applied to the study of food webs (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Dunne et al. 2002; Solé 
and Montoya 2001; Strogatz 2001). A network is error resistant (or resistant to failure) when it is 
unlikely to be damaged by random removal of nodes. On the other hand, a network is sensitive to 
attack when it can be either highly damaged or destroyed by a targeted attack, such as the selective 
removal of highly-connected nodes (Albert and Barabasi 2002; Dunne et al. 2002).  
 
4.2.4 New models of cascading extinctions: removal with probability 
The sequential removal from most- to least-connected species (intentional attack) and random 
extinction of species (random removal) are two limit criteria for determining primary extinctions in 
food webs (least- to most-connected should be the other limit criterion, but it is rarely used in 
practice), and both approaches have been widely used to study patterns of secondary extinctions in 
ecosystems as well as to measure food web robustness. However, it is possible to introduce other 
removal criteria along the continuum from the random removal of species to the intentional attack. 
Across ecosystems, certain species - not necessarily the most connected - can be more prone to 
extinction, either because preferentially targeted by natural or human agents (e.g. pollution, species 
invasion, overexploitation, weather extremes) or for internal dynamics or properties of the 
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biological community (e.g. size-dependent dynamics). Other factors can decrease the species risk of 
extinction, e.g. the ability of consumers to use or prey on other resources in the case of resource loss 
(i.e. “rewiring of the food web”), or the human conservation efforts. In this context, a valuable 
approach to primary species extinction in food webs is to introduce non-uniform and non-
deterministic criteria for species extinction. The introduction of probabilistic approaches to species 
extinction may offer more realistic predictions of both primary and secondary extinction dynamics 
in food webs as well as insights on possible transitions in system behaviour (e.g. from robustness to 
fragility). Further, a probabilistic approach can help understand how changes in the primary 
extinction risk of species affect secondary extinctions in ecosystem. 
In a recent work, Gallos et al. (2006) studied the robustness of scale-free networks, i.e. networks 
whose degree-distribution follows a power law. They used the probability W(k)  k for a node of 
degree k (i.e. number of links of the node) to become inactive, where for: (i)  = 0 the removal is 
random; (ii)  < 0 low-degree nodes are more vulnerable; (iii)  > 0 high-degree nodes are more 
likely to be removed than low-degree nodes. Gallos et al. (2006)  showed that a little increase of  
strongly reduces the percolation threshold pc. In other words, with a moderate increase of the 
probability of removing highly-connected nodes, the scale-free network is quickly destroyed 
following the inactivation of a small number of nodes.   
So far, how network robustness changes when increasing the probability of removing highly-
connected nodes has not been studied either in model or empirical food webs. Here, we analyze the 
robustness of 14 empirical food webs to node loss by introducing a parameter I (intentionality) that 
defines the probability of removing highly-connected species. When I increases, so does  the 
extinction risk of highly-connected species.  
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4.3 Material and methods 
4.3.1 The empirical food webs data set 
A food web can be described as a directed network with S species (nodes) and L trophic interactions 
among them (links), describing who eats whom (Dunne 2006; Montoya et al. 2006). In this work, 
we used empirical food webs that represent a wide range of species numbers, link densities, taxa, 
habitat types (terrestrial, aquatic an transition ecosystems). In Table 1, we report the basic 
properties of each food web, such as number of species (S), average number of links per species 
(L/S), and connectance (C=L/S
2
). Since S
2 
is the maximum possible number of trophic interactions 
in a S x S matrix, food web connectance describes the realized fraction of trophic interactions in the 
food web. 
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Table 1:  Main features of food webs used in this study. L, total number of links in the food web; S, number of species; 
C, food web connectance (L/S
2
). Refs: literature  reference for the food web. Keys: short id of food web. 
 
Food web S C=L/S2 L/S          Refs Key 
Bridge Brook Lake 25 0.171 4.28 Havens, 2002 Br 
Coachella Valley 29 0.312 9.03 Polis, 1991 Co 
Cheasepeake Bay 31 0.071 2.19 Baird and Ulanowicz, 1989 Ch 
St Martin Island 42 0.116 4.88 Goldwasser and Roughgarden, 1998 SM 
St Marks Seagrass 48 0.096 4.60 Christian and Luczkovich, 1999 SMk 
Grassland 61 0.026 1.59 Martinez et al. 1999 Gr 
Ythan Estuary 91 83 0.057 4.76 Hall and Raffaelli, 1991 Y91 
Scotch Broom 85 0.031 2.62 Memmot et al., 2000 Sc 
Stony Stream 109 0.07 2.19 Townsend et al., 1996 St 
Little Rock Lake 92 0.118 10.84 Martinez, 1999 Li 
Canton Creek 102 0.067 6.83 Townsend et al., 1996 Ca 
Ythan Estuary 96 124 0.038 4.76 Huxham et al., 1996; Y96 
El Verde Rainforest 155 0.063 9.74 Waide and Reagan, 1996 El 
Mirror Lake 172 0.146 25.13 Dunne et al., 2002 Mi 
 
4.3.2 Robustness 
Food web robustness is usually tested with simulations in which a single species is removed at each 
step (i.e. primary extinction), and the number of secondary extinctions (i.e. extinctions following 
the primary extinction) is recorded (Allesina and Pascual, 2009; Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne and 
Williams 2009; Solé and Montoya 2001). Species going primarily extinct may be selected 
according to a particular criterion (i.e. random removal, decreasing or increasing number of 
connections etc..), and primary extinctions are repeated until all the species have gone extinct. With 
a topological approach (i.e. based on presence/absence or links, with no information on interaction 
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strength), a network node goes extinct when it loses all incoming links. In food webs, that means a 
species goes extinct when it is left without any exploitable resources.  
Here, we test the robustness of 14 empirical food webs (Table 1) by introducing a novel criterion 
for primary extinctions. We assume that consumers cannot switch from one type of prey to another 
(i.e. no food web “rewiring”). Several measures of food web robustness have been proposed, such 
as secondary extinction area (Allesina and Pascual 2009), error and attack sensitivity (Allesina and 
Bodini 2004; Allesina et al. 2006), R25 (Srinivasan et al. 2007). In this work, we use ‘structural 
robustness’ (R), that is the proportion of primary extinctions leading to a particular proportion of 
total extinctions (Curtsdotter et al. 2011; Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne and Williams 2009; Dunne, 
2006): 
  
E
R
S
                                                                                                       (1) 
where E is the number of primary extinctions that produces a percentage  of total extinctions 
(primary + secondary) out of the total number of species S in the food web. We used two measures 
of  R: (i) the proportion of primary extinctions triggering the loss of half of the species (R50)  
(Curtsdotter et al. 2001; Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne and Williams 2009; Dunne, 2006) , and (ii) the 
proportion of primary extinctions causing food web collapse (i.e. extinction of all species, R100) 
(Dunne 2006; Ebenman 2011). The maximum possible value of robustness when using R50 is 0.5 
(i.e. half of the species must be removed to trigger the loss of half of the species in the food web), 
while the minimum is 1/S (i.e. the extinction of one species leads to the extinction of half of the 
species in the food web). For R100 , maximum and minimum values of robustness are 1 and 1/S, 
respectively.  
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4.3.3 Attack strategies 
We introduce a novel attack strategy where the extinction (removal) probability of species is 
determined by a probability mass function. The total number of trophic interactions k of a species in 
a food web (i.e. degree of the node/species) is the sum of the number of the ingoing links (resources 
or prey) and the number of the outgoings links (consumers or predators).  
We used two different probability mass functions to define the removal probability of species in a 
food web, namely the exponential and the power-law probability mass functions. 
In the first case, the probability of removing a species with k trophic interactions with intentionality 
I, PE( = k|I), is defined by the family of exponential probability mass functions: 
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         (2) 
where kmax is the maximum number of trophic interactions for a species, kmin the minimum number, 
Nk the number of species with degree k. The subscript E in PE specifies the exponential probability 
mass function. From now on, we simply use PE(k|I) in order to simplify notation. When I→1, we 
tend to sequentially remove the most connected species (intentional attack), where:  
 
max
1
( |1) lim ( | ) ,E
I
P k P k I k k

         (3) 
When I = 0, species are randomly removed, i.e. all nodes share the same probability of being 
removed: 
 ( | 0) /E k totP k N N           (4) 
where Ntot indicates the total number of nodes in the network. In the second case, the removal 
probability PP(k|I) of nodes is defined by the power-law probability mass function: 
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where ki indicates the degree of node i, the exponent I is the intentionality parameter (corresponding 
to parameter   in Gallos et al. (2006)) and the subscript P in PP indicates the power law. With the 
power-law formulation, the probability of removing highly-connected species increases with I, 
where for I = 0 species are randomly removed, and with I→∞ nodes are removed from most- to 
least-connected. We chose the power-law probability mass function in order to compare robustness 
of food webs to that of scale-free networks in Gallos et al. (2006). 
In addition, as a third scenario we removed species from the most- to the least-connected (i.e. 
intentional attack). The degree k is recalculated with each new primary extinction. In the case of 
ties, i.e. nodes with the same degree, we randomly ordered those nodes. 
Since the result of simulations using Eq. (2), Eq. (5) and with the intentional attack are stochastic 
realizations, for each value of I and each food web we carried out 1000 simulations. We used the 
mean across replicates as our measure of robustness for both R50 ( 50R ) and R100 ( 100R ). We could 
not directly compare the results obtained with the two family of functions as we had to use different 
sets of values of I for the power-law and exponential probability mass functions. For the 
exponential removal probability function (Eq. (2)), we used I values obtained by bisections from 
I~1 to I=0 (I = 0, 0.00098, 0.00196, 0.00390625, 0.0078125, 0.015625, 0.03125, 0.0625, 0.125, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.9999). We used the following bisections in order to analyse in greater details the 
increase of the removal probability in the highest degrees region. 
For the power-law removal probability function (Eq. (5)), we used the same set of I values used by 
Gallos et al. (2006) (I = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4) in order to directly compare the response of scale-free 
networks presented in Gallos et al. (2006) to that of food webs. 
4.3.4 The breakpoint threshold pattern 
A visual inspection of plots of robustness R (
50R and 100R ) vs. I when using the exponential function 
in Eq. (2) showed that R was fairly constant for increasing I up to a threshold value after which it 
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sharply declined with further increases of I. To fit these trajectories, we used two-phase regression 
models, that is regression models in which two straight lines are connected at a breakpoint It,  in the 
form: 
 1 1 t
2 2 t
         
         
R  I   for I I
R I    for I I
 
 
  

  
 
with the restriction for continuity  
1 1 2 2t tb I I     . We fitted the two-phase regressions using 
the library segmented available for R (R Development Core Team 2011). Parameters estimation 
proceeds in two parts: a generalized linear model (GLM) is first fitted to the data, then a broken-line 
relationship (estimation of slopes and breakpoint) is added by re-fitting the model. We used  Davies 
test for significant difference-in-slope (Davies 1987). We set statistical significance at the 0.05 
level. We carried out all simulations and statistical analyses using R 2.14.0 (R Development Core 
Team  2011). 
4.3.5 Robustness-complexity relationship 
We used linear regressions on both linear and log-log scales to explore the relationship between It 
and two parameters describing food web complexity, namely species richness (S) and connectance 
(C= L/S
2
) (Table 1). We used AIC to select the best model (we corrected the likelihood when the 
response variable was log-transformed). 
4.4 Results. 
4.4.1 Robustness with exponential probability of primary extinction  
Using the exponential probability mass function, a value of intentionality close to 1 (i.e. close to the 
maximum value allowed by the probability mass function) was necessary across food webs to 
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obtain robustness values for both 
50R  and 100R comparable to those obtained with the intentional 
attack (Figs. 11 and 12). 
For increasing I, we observed a slow-to-fast decrease in robustness after reaching a threshold value. 
The Davies test for difference-in-slope was significant for each food web and for both 
50R  and 100R
(Table 2). For all the food webs, the slope of the regression line for values of  intentionality I > It 
was on average an order of magnitude greater than the slope of the regression line for I < It (Table 
2). Only in Mirror lake food web (for 
50R ) a sharp decrease in robustness was not observed. 
Interestingly, some food webs showed an increase in robustness with increasing intentionality 
before the sharp decline in robustness for values of I greater than It. 
4.4.2 Robustness with power law probability of primary extinction 
For both measures of robustness, increasing intentionality generally decreased robustness, although 
for two food webs (Bridge for 
50R  and Coachella for 100R ) robustness tended to increase for values 
of I up to  2. Across food webs, robustness for I = 1 in Eq. (5) was substantially greater than 
robustness obtained with the intentional attack for both 
50R  and 100R  (Fig. 13, Fig. 14). Only when 
setting I = 4 in Eq. (5), and only for some food webs, we obtained values of robustness similar to 
the one given by the intentional attack. 
 
Table 2: Two-phase linear regression of the robustness measures (
50R  and 100R ) on intentionality I for the exponential 
probability function. The breakpoint It indicates the value of the intentionality at which the transition of system response 
occurred (i.e. slow-to-fast decrease in robustness). b1 and b2 are the slopes of the straight lines on the left and on the 
right of It, respectively, while a1 and  a2 are the respective intercepts. We present standard errors for all parameters 
estimates except for a2, since it was calculated and not estimated in the two-phase regression. p-values of the Davies test 
for difference-in-slope are all smaller than 0.01 except for 
50R  for Mirror (p = 0.078). 
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Table 2, cont’d 
Food Web Breakpoint It 1 2 1 2 
50R  
Bridge Brook Lake 0.9±0.01 0.0021±0.00034 -0.03±0.0009 0.463±0.011 0.8 
Coachella Valley 0.163±0.002 0.00017±0.0003 -0.0244±0.002 0.4769±0.002 0.7055 
Cheasepeake Bay 0.095±0.002 -0.0018±0.001 -0.04168±0.003 0.3551±0.006 0.6949 
St Martin Island 0.194±0.03 -0.0023±0.0009 -0.0499±0.0049 0.4263±0.005 0.8807 
St Marks Seagrass 0.1175±0.004 -0.000716±0.0008 -0.05483±0.003 0.4306±0.005 0.911 
Grassland 0.17±0.05 -0.000301±0.0007 -0.0398±0.004 0.2377±0.004 0.606 
Ythan Estuary 91 0.025±0.003 -0.00618±0.008 -0.0587±0.012 0.3812±0.003 0.7289 
Scotch Broom 0.022±0.0002 -0.00553±0.006 -0.0527±0.008 0.3158±0.02 0.6153 
Stony Stream 0.027±0.001 -0.0012±0.001 -0.0156±0.001 0.4918±0.003 0.5883 
Little Rock Lake 0.011±0.002 0.00186±0.0043 -0.0236±0.005 0.4006±0.014 0.537 
Canton Creek 0.0115±0.013 0.00014±0.001 -0.01081±0.001 0.4787±0.003 0.5386 
Ythan Estuary 96 0.015±0.002 -0.0029±0.008 -0.0534±0.01 0.3717±0.03 0.6695 
El Verde Rainforest 0.026±0.003 -0.00187±0.002 -0.03421±0.002 0.4394±0.01 0.6551 
Mirror Lake 0.011±0.006 -0.00124±0.001 -0.00408±0.001 0.4665±0.004 0.4818 
100R  
Bridge Brook Lake 0.34± 0.008 0.0004±0.0007 -0.054±0.00375 0.8213±0.004 1.345 
Coachella Valley 0.18±0.001 0.0041±0.0013 -0.081±0.0074 0.7501±0.008 1.571 
Cheasepeake Bay 0.072±0.0002 -0.0009±0.0012 -0.053±0.0023 0.660±0.0053 1.078 
St Martin Island 0.17±0.0009 -0.0042±0.0012 -0.094±0.007 0.7496±0.007 1.578 
St Marks Seagrass 0.096±0.001 -0.003977±0.002 -0.0816±0.0042 0.761±0.007 1.424 
Grassland 0.11±0.009 -0.00113±0.001 -0.0483±0.003 0.4754±0.005 0.8879 
Ythan Estuary 91 0.0122±0.03 0.0011±0.012 -0.0794±0.014 0.6058±0.039 1.054 
Scotch Broom 0.0123±0.002 -0.0059±0.011 -0.0688±0.013 0.4500±0.037 0.8009 
Stony Stream 0.027±0.01 -0.004848±0.0034 -0.0765±0.0048 0.888±0.013 1.37 
Little Rock Lake 0.026±0.009 -0.00245±0.0021 -0.049±0.003 0.7283±0.008 1.042 
Canton Creek 0.045±0.04 -0.0066±0.0038 -0.0986±0.008 0.8913±0.017 1.576 
Ythan Estuary 96 0.0135±0.01 -0.0043±0.011 -0.082±0.013 0.6168±0.036 1.062 
El Verde Rainforest 0.02±0.0003 -0.0059±0.004 -0.0598±0.0051 0.7963±0.014 1.134 
Mirror Lake 0.038±0.004 -0.0038±0.0022 -0.0619±0.0041 0.9202±0.001 1.34 
 
4.4.3 Relationship between breakpoint and complexity 
Food web connectance C showed no statistically-significant relationship with breakpoint It for 50R  
with variables either on either linear or log-log scale, while we found a negative relationship 
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between C and It for 100R  on both scales (p<0.01, Table 3). We found a negative linear relationship 
between species richness and It on both linear and log-log scales (p<0.01, Table 3). AIC strongly 
indicated the model on the linear scale as the best one. We found a negative linear relationship 
between S  and the breakpoint of the two-phase regression It for 100R  (p<0.01), and also in this case 
AIC was lower for the model on the linear scale (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Parameters of the regression models on the linear scale for the relationship between It and 
a) connectance, b) species richness. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion of the results 
4.5.1 The sharp transition in the number of secondary extinction 
Our study shows that when increasing the probability of deleting highly-connected species there is a 
sharp transition in system behaviour, from a region where food webs show high resistance to 
species loss (‘random removal regime’) to a region where robustness decreases rapidly and quickly 
reaches the robustness obtained with the sequential attack from most- to least-connected species 
(‘intentional attack regime’). This pattern was particular clear when using the exponential 
probability removal function, although a fast decrease in robustness with increasing intentionality 
 Breakpoint 
50R  Breakpoint 100R  
 Slope Intercept p Slope Intercept p 
Connectance 1.1412±0.832 0.0150±0.102 0.20 0.7262±0.291 0.0113±0.035 <0.01 
Species richness -0.0027±0.001 0.352066±0.11 <0.05 -0.0013±0.0004 0.1953±0.04 <0.01 
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was observed in the majority of food webs when using the power-law probability mass function, in 
particular for 
100R . 
For 
100R , we found that connectance increased the value of intentionality at which the transition  
between the two regimes of robustness occurred (i.e. breakpoint of the two-phase regression) (Table 
3). This result suggests that food webs with greater connectance are less affected than low-
connectance food webs by an increase of the extinction risk of highly-connected species. This result 
is in agreement with previously investigations showing an increase of food web robustness with 
connectance (Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne et al. 2004; Dunne and Williams 2009). The regime 
transition at a larger value of intentionality that we found in our analyses for food webs with higher 
connectance may have two different explanations. First, it may be related to the buffer provided by 
an high number of trophic connections against further extinctions in the event of species loss 
(Dunne et al. 2002). Second, it may be explained by the degree-distribution of food webs, which 
typically changes from distributions similar to power-law to exponential or uniform with increasing 
connectance (Dunne 2006; Dunne et al. 2002; Montoya and Solé 2003). In fact,  in food webs with 
highly-skewed degree-distribution, highly-connected species are more likely to function as “hubs” 
and their extinction may have dramatic effects on the stability of ecosystems, while in food webs 
with a more uniform degree-distribution the extinction of highly-connected species leads to a lower 
number of secondary extinction, thus preserving food web stability.  
However, when using 
50R  as a measure of robustness, we did not observe a significant relationship 
between connectance and robustness, even after removing a clear outlier.  
4.5.2 The complexity-stability relationship 
On the contrary, for both robustness measures we observed a negative linear relationship between 
the breakpoint of the two-phase regression and species richness (S). In empirical food webs, no 
relationship is typically found between robustness and species richness (Dunne et al. 2002; Dunne 
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et al. 2004), whereas in model food webs species richness increases robustness (Dunne and 
Williams 2009).  In our extinction scenarios, larger food webs seem to be more sensitive to the 
increase of intentionality (i.e. to the preferential targeting of highly-connected species). Also this 
pattern may be explained by variations in the shape of the degree-distribution, as its skewness tends 
to increase with species richness (Montoya and Solé 2003). In terms of conservation ecology, this 
result suggests that protecting highly-connected species may be more important in larger 
ecosystems. In fact, a smaller value of the breakpoint of the two-phase regression of robustness on 
intentionality (i.e., the transition from ‘random removal’ to ‘intentional attack’ regime) increases 
the probability of falling in the intentional attack regime in the case highly-connected are 
preferentially targeted. Since in larger food webs the transition in system behaviour occurred for 
lower values of intentionality, it follows that the preservation of highly-connected species may be 
particularly important for the stability of larger ecosystems. 
In addition, this threshold effect strongly suggests that when modelling extinction dynamics to 
carefully assign or estimate a risk of primary extinction to species as a function of their number of 
trophic links. In fact, intentionality values slightly smaller or bigger than the breakpoint of the two-
phase regression may lead to substantially different patterns of secondary extinction, as well as 
largely different estimates of food web robustness.  
When using the power-law function to define the extinction probability of highly-connected 
species, patterns of robustness of food webs differed from those showed by Gallos et al. (2006) for 
scale-free networks. Scale-free networks are typically highly robust to random removal of nodes, 
but become fragile when highly-connected nodes are removed. In scale-free networks, the attack 
with I = 1 in Eq. (5) can reduce the percolation threshold in scale free network to pc = 0.25, from pc 
= 1 when nodes are randomly removed (I = 0) (Gallos et al. 2006). Contrary to what found for 
scale-free networks, a small increase in the extinction risk of highly-connected species does not 
strongly reduce the robustness of food webs. This is likely to be ascribed to the structural 
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differences between scale-free networks and food webs. First, the number of nodes N is much 
smaller in food webs (typically < 200, in our study 9 < N < 140) than in scale-free networks 
(> 1000) (Camacho et al. 2002; Dunne 2006). Second, food webs exhibit smaller maximum node 
degree, and the degree-distribution in food webs is in general less skewed than a power-law 
(Camacho et al. 2002; Dunne 2006). Clearly, with respect to a scale-free network, a smaller 
maximum degree of the food web along with a less skewed degree-distribution would reduce the 
probability of attacking highly-connected nodes with an increase of intentionality. Since scale free 
networks did not show a threshold response to the increase in the intentionality parameter (Gallos et 
al. 2006), the emergence of the breakpoint not does not seem to be a general occurrence in all 
networks. 
An interesting question is how the addition of ecological dynamics may modify the results 
presented here. In addition, the food webs we analysed in this work are binary, i.e. they describe 
only the presence of trophic interaction and do not describe the amount of energy passing from 
resource to consumer (i.e. interaction strength). Thus, it would be interesting to use our 
methodology with weighted food webs, that is food webs including information about the amount 
of the energy and matter passing along a trophic interaction (Bellingeri and Bodini 2013; Bodini et 
al. 2009; Thierry et al. 2011). Finally, the same approach we used in the present work could be 
applied to food webs where rewiring (i.e., modification of trophic interactions) may occur. 
Rewiring in the food web may simply occur when a predator consumes prey species not included in 
the trophic data. However, in modern data sets it is unlikely that potential resources resulting from 
switching prey go unregistered (Allesina and Pascual 2009). Alternatively, food web rewiring may 
occur when following the extinction of one of its competitors (competitive release), a consumer 
might expand its diet to include a prey that it had previously been not available (Staniczenko et al. 
2010; Thierry et al. 2011). Finally, a consumer species forages on the subset of possible prey items 
that provides it with the highest net energy intake per unit effort (optimal foraging strategy). 
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Following the loss of its preferred prey item(s), a predator may expand its diet to include novel 
resources (Thierry et al. 2011). All the above processes can thus be potentially included in the 
analysis of food webs and exploring how food web robustness changes with increasing 
intentionality when modification of trophic interaction may occur is thus encouraged. 
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Figure 10: Removal probability PE(k|I) of a species with k trophic interactions for three value of intentionality I (solid 
line, I = 0; dashed line, I = 0.1; point-dashed line, I = 0.2) in Eq. (2.2) (exponential probability mass function) for St 
Marks food web. The solid horizontal line represents the random removal extinction scenario. The probability of 
removing highly-connected species increases with I. 
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Figure 11: Robustness 
50R  as a function of intentionality I  when using the exponential function in Eq. (2) for each of 
the 14 food webs we analysed. Note that the y axis is different for each food web in order to facilitate the visual analysis 
of patterns. ○ represent results using the exponential probability function; ∆ (in red) indicates 
50R  for the intentional 
attack, from most- to least-connected species. Almost food webs show a slow decrease of 
50R  when I increases 
(Bridge, Coachella, Little Rock and Canton Creek food webs show a little increase) and then a sharp decrease after a 
critical value of I. The key on each panel identifies the food web as reported in Table 1. Left to right I = 0, 0.00098, 
0.00196, 0.00390625, 0.0078125, 0.015625, 0.03125, 0.0625, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.9999.   
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Figure 12: Robustness 
100R  as a function of intentionality I  when using the exponential function in Eq. (2) for each of 
the 14 food webs we analysed. Note that the y axis is different for each food web in order to facilitate the visual analysis 
of patterns. ∆ (in red) indicates 
100R  for the intentional attack, from most- to least-connected species. For the 
exponential function, almost all food webs show a slow decrease of 
100R  when the intentionality of the removal 
criterion is increased (Bridge, Coachella and YThan Estuary 91 food webs show a slight increase of robustness with 
increasing I) and then a sharp decrease after a critical value of intentionality is reached. The key on each panel identifies 
the food web as reported in Table 1.  Left to right I = 0, 0.00098, 0.00196, 0.00390625, 0.0078125, 0.015625, 0.03125, 
0.0625, 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 0.9999.  
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Figure 13: Robustness 
50R  as a function of intentionality I when using the power law function in Eq. (5) for each of 
the 14 food webs we analysed. ∆ (in red) indicates 
50R  for the intentional attack, that is with sequential primary 
extinctions from the most- to the least-connected species. Left to right I = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4. 
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Figure 14: Robustness 
100R  as a function of intentionality I for the power law function in Eq. (5) for each of the 14 
food webs we analysed. ∆ (in red) indicates 
100R for the intentional attack, that is with sequential primary extinctions 
from the most- to the least-connected species. Left to right I = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4. 
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